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BOOK REVIEWS
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING. By Herman Goldstein. McGraw-Hill,
1990. Pp. 206.
Two centuries ago, a self-educated London magistrate named
Patrick Colquhoun published a landmark treatise, The Police of the
Metropolis.' The book was destined to become as influential on
crime control as Karl Marx's Capital became on the economy. Col-
quhoun became known as "the architect who designed our modem
police ' 2, and the book became the blueprint for Sir Robert Peel's
construction of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, as well as
American versions of that institution a few years later.3 Colquh-
oun's treatise opens with this Preface:
Police in this country may be considered as a new Science; the properties
of which consist not in the Judicial Powers which lead to punishment,
and which belong to Magistrates alone; but in the Prevention and De-
tection of Crimes, and in those other Functions which relate to inter-
nal regulations for the well ordering and comfort of civil society.4
After Colquhoun, prevention, detection, and regulation became
the goals of policing, with visible uniformed patrol its primary
method. But as often happens with great ideas, much of the content
of Colquhoun's book was lost when it was put into practice. The
extent to which police ever adopted Colquhoun's ideas is as hotly
debated as the extent to which Soviet Communism was faithful to
Marx. 5 On one point, however, there is widespread academic con-
sensus. Since at least World War II, the American police have let
the process of policing displace Colquhoun's concern for the results of
police work.
This insight was first and most convincingly articulated by Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law Professor Herman Goldstein, whose Prob-
lem-Oriented Policing has already become the blueprint for a new
police institution and the most influential treatise on police since
1 PATRICK COLQUHOUN, THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS (7th ed. 1806).
2 WILLIAM L. MELVILLE LEE, A HISTORY OF POLICE IN ENGLAND (1901).
3 WILBUR R. MILLER, CoPs AND BOBBIES (1977).
4 COLQUHOUN, supra note 1, at preface.
5 SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM (1977).
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Colquhoun's. 6 In a 1979 article that introduced the conceptual
framework of his book, Goldstein compared modern police to bus
drivers who cannot stop to pick up passengers because to do so
would make them fall behind schedule. 7 He noted the obsession of
the 20th Century police reform movement with the internal man-
agement of police organizations, and its virtually complete lack of
concern with the substantive tasks police were asked to accomplish.
Giving police chiefs civil service terms was an important reform is-
sue; policing domestic violence was not. Educational requirements
for police recruits was an important issue; reducing armed robbery
was not. Controlling police corruption was an important issue;
preventing barroom brawls was not. There was too much concern
with administering the hospital and not enough concern with treat-
ing the patients. In the metaphor of business, no one was paying
attention to the bottom line.
Goldstein went on to prescribe a strategy for policing for re-
sults. He advocated abandoning the criminal law as the organizing
framework for defining problems, replacing it with substantive pat-
terns of behavior. "Aggravated assault," for example, is far too
broad a category of events to comprise a clear target for police ef-
forts to control the problem. But youth gang rumbles, domestic
stabbings, barfights and driveby shootings among drug dealers each
constitute discrete, homogeneous crime patterns that police can di-
agnose and attack. "Taking a problem apart" was the most impor-
tant step Goldstein advocated, to be followed by a diagnosis of the
problem's causes and some hypotheses about the problem's possi-
ble solutions. It is this emphasis on clear definition of highly spe-
cific problems as targets for police attack which gives the problem-
oriented policing strategy its name.
The 1979 article caused a national sensation in the police re-
form community. As one commentary observed, "Goldstein's pre-
scription was so penetratingly simple and so profoundly sensible
that it not only spawned a number of experiments in police agencies
to attempt to put his ideas into practice but also triggered nearly a
decade of debate over what his prescription really meant and how it
might be realized." Goldstein's book reflects and reviews the first
decade of the idea's impact, richly illustrated with case studies of
problem selection, definition, diagnosis, solutions and evaluations.
6 HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (1990).
7 Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & DE-
LINO. 236 (1979).




The book begins with a restatement and elaboration of the ba-
sic 1979 framework. It then proceeds to assess the early exper-
iences with the strategy in Madison (with Goldstein himself
participating), Baltimore County, Newport News and London. He
explores the major issue of how his own muscular conceptual frame-
work relates to the flabby content of "community policing," a politi-
cally appealing label which has become far more popular than
Goldstein's own. Separate chapters examine the identification of
problems, their analysis, the search for better responses to them,
and the overall changes in police management needed to make
problem-oriented policing work.
The result is at once a magisterial review and a practical guide-
book for action. It is a wise and thoughtful commentary based on
extensive experience in the field, reflecting great erudition in the
substantive police literature. Its calm and balanced tone under-
states the book's radical attack on current police practice, with its
revolutionary implications for all aspects of the police institution:
who becomes police, how they are trained, how they are rewarded,
what powers society will grant them. The proposals amount to
nothing less than making the police work a matter of brains far more
than brawn, a profession as complicated as neurosurgery or nuclear
engineering. The fact that many current police (including my own
students) are not able to get past the somewhat dense and formal
style of the book is unimportant, since Goldstein's work has many
populizers.
I. THE PARADOX OF RESULTS
The most effective and creative populizers, John Eck and Wil-
liam Spelman, use the acronym "SARA" to help readers recall the
four basic steps or problem-oriented policing: Scanning the environ-
ment for problem selection, Analyzing the problem selected, Respond-
ing to the problem in a new and different way, and Assessing the
results of the new response. 9 This structure helps clarify the pro-
cess of policing for results. Yet it also helps reveal a paradox in
Goldstein's path-breaking work, found in the final letter of the acro-
nym. The paradox is that the book's emphasis on the importance of results
is unsupported by any serious concern with the measurement of results. For
despite the book's success in focusing police attention on the effects
of what they do, the book is almost cavalier in its disregard for the
complexity of causal inference necessary for the assessment of those
effects.
9 JOHN E. ECK & WILLIAM SPELMAN, PROBLEM-SOLVING (1987).
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This paradox leaves the blueprint unfinished. Goldstein has
designed a brilliant foundation for policing over the next several
centuries. He has charted the ways in which creative people can
build upon that foundation to attack crime problems which have not
even been invented yet. But he has omitted a design element that is
at least as important as a roof, without which the building cannot
last.
The roof we need is some protection against self-delusion
about success. Encouraging police to focus on results creates a gen-
eral temptation to claim success for every attempted solution. From
the patrol officer handling a single dispute to a police chief develop-
ing a city-wide policy, the inventors of solutions appropriately want
to be acclaimed for their good work. The failure of a police effort to
produce its desired results is more painful than not attending to re-
sults at all. Thomas Edison saw failure as learning one more way
not to make a lightbulb, but police whose solutions fail may be emo-
tionally devastated. Unless the rules of determining success or fail-
ure are clearly laid out in advance, problem-oriented policing may
be destroyed by fraudulent claims of success.
Goldstein does not provide those rules. He does provide some
general discussion of the issue, consuming less than three pages.' 0
But the discussion lacks clear examples, and seems half-hearted.
While other sections of the book offer stern warnings of other dan-
gers, this section shows no hint of admonition.
Business has a bottom line, but it also has the independent au-
dit. Surgery has the patient's recovery, but it also has the second
opinion. Academics write books, but they must also undergo book
reviews. Each of these systems is a set of rules for evaluating the
results of professional work. The rules may vary in the fairness or
accuracy of the assessments they produce, but they all insure that
the results are judged by someone independent of those who did
the work. Anything else is a conflict of interest. Yet Goldstein of-
fers no clear warning against such conflicts.
That omission may encourage police to continue to take credit
when crime goes down, while blaming "social factors" beyond their
control when crime goes up. It may encourage police to declare
that all their problem-solving efforts a success, regardless of the ac-
tual results. It may discourage police from learning the principles of
casual inference needed for more rigorous evaluations of their
10 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6.
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work." At worst, it will leave police as ignorant of the results of
their work as they were before the book was written.
II. Two CASE STUDIES
Two examples from the book illustrate its paradox of results.
Both are case studies which Goldstein presents as strong examples
of successful results of policing. One of his conclusions seems quite
compelling. The other one violates almost every cannon of evalua-
tion research.
A. THE CASE OF THE VIBRATING JUKEBOX
The first case comes from Philadelphia, where a sergeant was
exposed to the concept of problem-oriented policing.12 Assigned to
a new district, the sergeant discovered police officers were being
dispatched several times a day on a noise complaint about the same
bar. On checking, he found there had been 505 calls about the same
problem in just the last six months.'
3
The officers assigned to the 505 calls had always responded to
the bar, but never found the noise to be very loud. After some effort
to identify the complainant, the police conducted decibel meter
studies to show that the noise in the bar did not violate local law.
But further analysis showed it was the vibrations from the jukebox
that disturbed the bar's neighbor, shaking the common wall be-
tween the two buildings. Police then negotiated a solution: the juke-
box was moved to another wall, and the calls for police service
stopped. 14
This case study is an archetype of common sense. Not only was
the solution painfully simple, so was the assessment of its success.
To question whether the solution "worked" is to belabor the obvi-
ous. The cause of the problem (the jukebox location) was easily iso-
lated and eliminated. Once that was done, the problem-defined as
calls to the police-clearly stopped because of what the police did.
I1 See, e.g., THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DE-
SIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979).
12 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 81.
13 This fact alone speaks volumes about the state of modern police work. It may help
the uninitiated reader understand why Goldstein's ideas are so important. Only an insti-
tution blindly going through the motions of answering calls for service, without any
regard for the results of those responses, could allow such a pattern to develop. The
fact that different officers may have been dispatched on each separate occasion may help
explain it , but does not justify it. It is precisely the need to look for and address such
problems that is the basis of Goldstein's strategy.
14 Memorandum from William Bugg to Inspector Edward McGlaughlin, Philadelphia
Police Department, March 15, 1988, cited in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 81.
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The sequel to the police action was obviously a result of police work,
in the sense that police work caused the result to occur. To suggest
that the calls may have stopped because the neighbor died, or
moved away, or had her phone disconnected for nonpayment of
bills, or was threatened by the bar owner, or was caused by any
other reason besides the police intervention would be bad manners
at best.
But this case is deceptively simple. The close correlation in
time between the police action and the cessation of calls makes the
hypothesis of police success quite compelling. As a matter of com-
mon sense, the odds of a rival hypothesis explaining the cessation of
calls seems very low. While some other explanation is admittedly
possible, it seems extremely improbable in the circumstances. If
every challenge for problem-oriented policing were as simple to as-
sess, there would be no point to the present essay.
But the principle remains: the elimination of rival hypotheses.15 As
philosopher of science Karl Popper has argued, it is not possible to
"prove" a causal relationship between two events, or any hypothe-
sis.16 All one can do is fail to disprove it. One of the best ways to do
that is to eliminate rival hypotheses, or develop alternate theories
about why a given event occurred-such as the cessation of noise
complaints about the bar. The more rival theories are eliminated,
the greater the confidence one places in the central hypothesis.
Under this philosophy of science, the truth of any theory becomes a
matter of degree rather than an either-or question.
Few of the problems police must address, especially the most
serious, provide such clear-cut evaluations of police efforts. Gold-
stein concedes this point 17, but then dismisses academic-style de-
bate over the results of police-work as likely to "inhibit well-
motivated, innovative people in the police field from making any
claims about the value of their efforts."' 8 That may be true if such
debate is conducted crudely, but not if the principles of evaluation
are introduced slowly to police culture and presented as integral to
the very idea of problem-oriented policing. By omitting proper
evaluation techniques from his blueprint, Goldstein runs the risk
that "well-motivated, innovative people" will fool themselves into
15 DONALD T. CAMPBELL &JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUAsI-EXPERIMEN-
TAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1963); Donald T. Campbell & H. Laurence Ross, The Con-
necticut Crackdown on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 3 LAW & Soc'y
REV. 33 (1968); COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 11.
16 KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (1959).




believing they are successful, even when they are not. For while he
warns against "making bold claims for the value of police strategy
without any persuasive evidence," 19 he fails to warn against making
bold claims when there is persuasive evidence both for and against
success. While he advocates a "middle ground by thinking through
more carefully what is involved in making statements about police
effectiveness," 20 the book does not provide that thinking. By failing
to put the weight of his enormous prestige and authority behind the
importance of principles of evaluation, he provides a de facto en-
dorsement of overblown claims of success and leaves more rigorous
independent evaluators vulnerable to charges of sour grapes.
B. THE CASE OF THE CONVENIENCE STORE CLERKS
The second case study in the book is a prime example of this
failing. In the mid-1980's, the Gainesville Police Department con-
ducted a master-piece of analysis in the spirit of problem-oriented
policing. Goldstein justifiably spotlights their effort as a model of
diagnosis. 2 1 The problem selected was convenience store robber-
ies, which had been steadily increasing in recent years. To under-
stand the problem, Gainesville police undertook pathbreaking
research, far beyond anything ever published in the criminological
literature. They discovered, for example, that the prevalence of
robbery was much higher for convenience stores than for other
types of retail establishments in town. Over a five-year period, 96%
of all forty-seven convenience stores were robbed, compared to
36% of the sixty-seven fast food establishments, 21%o of the sev-
enty-one gas stations, and 16% of the forty-four liquor stores.22
While they failed to take account of the differences in the number of
hours the stores were open and therefore at risk of being robbed,
23
they were at least able to confirm the scope of the target problem.
They went on to commission an interview study of incarcerated con-
venience store robbers, and to analyze the pattern of robbery events
as reflected in the narrative reports.
The pattern analysis showed that 92% of the robberies oc-
curred when a single clerk was on duty, usually with no other cus-
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 80.
22 W Clifton, Jr., Convenience Store Robberies in Gainesville Florida: An Interven-
tion Startegy by the Gainesville Police Department (1987) (unpublished report, on file at
the Gainesville, Florida Police Department).
23 Lawrence W. Sherman, Patrick R. Gartin & Michael E. Buerger, Hot Spots of Preda-
tory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1989).
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tomers present in the store. Often a robber would enter while other
customers were present and wait for them to leave before commit-
ting the robbery. The interviews with incarcerated robbers showed
that they rated having two clerks in the store as an important deter-
rent compared to other possible factors, although having a big
strong clerk alone was about as important to them. These findings
together supported the department's working hypothesis that re-
quiring two clerks in the stores at night would serve as a deterrent to
convenience store robbery.
The commendably detailed analysis, which was written up for
presentation to the City Council and later presented to national
scholarly meetings,24 does have an interesting omission. It gave no
consideration to the rival hypothesis that clerks working alone are in
an excellent position to commit fraud in reporting robberies as a
cover for their own embezzlement. The longstanding problem of
fraudulent robbery reports has been cited by former police chiefs in
Kansas City2 5 and Washington, D.C. 26 . One Kansas City example
was discovered when repeated robbery reports at one convenience
store led police to assign a stakeout team to the location, without
informing the clerk on duty. While the team was observing the loca-
tion, the clerk phoned in a robbery report. The officers immediately
entered the premises, where they had seen no one enter or leave for
many minutes prior to the clerk's call. A cash register audit showed
the clerk to be the thief, and he was charged with the crime.27 How
widespread this problem is may be anyone's guess, but a three year
review of robbery records in one southwestern convenience store
chain found that at least 9 of the 149 (6%) recorded robberies were
discovered to be employee thefts fraudulently reported as rob-
bery.28 Undetected frauds could be far more numerous.
The Gainesville analysis was impressively detailed, but more as
an advocate's brief than as a judicious opinion. It did consider con-
trary evidence from another interview study of convicted robbers
(not necessarily of convenience stores) in another state, but dis-
missed it as suspect since it was sponsored by the convenience store
industry. The analysis was careful in the way lawyers are careful,
rather than scientists: attempting to prove an argument rather than
24 Clifton, supra note 22.
25 Interview with Larry Joiner, Kansas City Police Chief (April 1989).
26 Interview with Jerry V. Wilson, former Washington D.C. Police Chief (November
1989).
27 Joiner, supra note 25.
28 Lawrence W. Sherman for the firm Aitchely, Russel, Waldrop & Hlavinka, Data
Analysis (1989) (unpublished supplemental to report prepared for Havner v. EZ-Mart,
Crime Control Research Corporation, on file with theJ. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY).
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to investigate a hypothesis. Its goal of legislative action was clearly
achieved. The recommendation was adopted by the City Council in
early 1987, and in the next six months police reported that the
number of convenience store robberies dropped by 65%.29
Goldstein's book reports this entire story, along with the Phila-
delphia jukebox case, as two "classic examples of what is involved in
problem-oriented policing: in the identification of problems, their
analysis, and the development of an effective response." 30 His ac-
count is so impressive that the New York Times editorial page, review-
ing Goldstein's book, heralded the Gainesville case as a dramatic
example of the successful results of the new approach to policing,
recommending the approach highly for New York.A' Not inciden-
tally, the Times coverage helped the Gainesville Police Department's
advocacy of a Florida state law requiring all convenience stores to
have two clerks on duty after dark. If passed, it would be the first
such state law in the country, and a major innovation in public pol-
icy apparently endorsed by the authority of Goldstein's writings.
Yet nowhere does Goldstein employ the principle of rival hy-
potheses.3 2 The only hint of qualification he offers in judging the
Gainesville case a success comes in one vague sentence that would
mean little to most police (and other) readers: "Predictably, the
long-range impact has been challenged by various interest groups,
and efforts to respond definitively to the challenges reflect the diffi-
culty in isolating the effect of any single change." 33 Careful reflec-
tion on this sentence may reveal the principle of rival hypotheses
embedded in it, but the reader has to work very hard to extract it.
The book clearly does not use the principle for any serious consid-
eration of the possibility that the decline in robberies might have
been the result of factors other than the two clerk law.
Goldstein's sentence supports the Gainesville police view that
anyone who questions their claim of success must be representing
an "interest group", and that alternative explanations should be
fought off as an attack on the police department.3 4 From all appear-
29 Clifton, supra note 22.
30 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 8 1.
31 David C. Anderson, Editorial Notebook: The Tyranny of 911, N.Y. TIMES, September
17, 1990, at A22, col. A.
32 See supra note 15.
33 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 81.
34 Full disclosure requires, for example, that the present writer report that he has
been and is currently employed as an expert witness in tort cases involving convenience
store security measures, on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendants. In the past, he has
also been retained by the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) as the
supervisor of the report prepared by Wilson, infra note 47, and as a consultant on the
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ances, the Gainesville police sincerely believe that the two clerk law
has "worked", and that its widespread adoption will help control
crime in the U.S. Anyone who disagrees is the enemy.3 5 Just as the
willingness to defer to police authority in the street encounters arbi-
trary arrests3 6 and even brutality37 , unwillingness to accept police
assertions about solutions to crime problems can provoke outrage
among police problem-solvers.38 Yet this kind of aggressive defen-
sive posture, supported by some evidence and the rejection of any
contrary evidence, is precisely what Goldstein should be warning
police against. Evangelizing for a single solution, rather than re-
maining open-minded about the evidence of its effectiveness, may
do little to help control crime in America.
If police accepted the principles of evaluation before undertak-
ing any solutions, however, they could go a long way towards avoid-
ing this problem of defensiveness. Goldstein's failure to instruct
police in those principles is the most unfortunate omission in the
book.
III. PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION
The basic principles of evaluation are not mysterious, and cer-
tainly not beyond the comprehension of police problem-solvers.
Understanding the principles does not require graduate education
or extensive experience in research. All it requires is an open, logi-
cal mind and a little patience, qualities many police in my training
classes have brought to their instruction in these principles. Some
of the technical jargon may be a bit off-putting, but the principles
are clearly explained in many undergraduate research methods
texts.3 9
Ever since evaluation pioneer Donald Campbell (with his col-
league H. Laurence Ross) evaluated the Connecticut speeding
crackdown over two decades ago4 0 , his formulation of evaluation
principles has warned policymakers against accepting simple before-
after changes as proof of effective programs. Without restating his
design of better research to evaluate the effectiveness of two clerks. He has, however,
no current or anticipated future financial ties to the convenience store industry.
35 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE 49 (1970).
36 DONALD J. BLAcK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 96 (1980).
37 Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Brutality-Answers to Key Questions, 10 TRANS-ACTION 5
(July-August 1968).
38 Personal observations of the Minneapolis Police Department's Repeat Call Ad-
dress Policing Unit (January-December 1987) and a representative of the Gainesville
Police Department at the Tallahasee, Florida meeting (October 1990).
39 See, e.g., HERMAN W. SMITH, STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 61 (1975).
40 CAMPBELL & Ross, supra note 15.
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arguments in full, it is appropriate here simply to apply those with
greater relevance to the case of the convenience store clerks. All of
them take the form of rival or alternate hypotheses to the conclusion
that the presence of two clerks at night deters convenience store
robberies.
A. HISTORY
The most basic principle for interpreting before-after change is
called history.4 1 This principle requires asking whether any other
change in the environment, besides the intervention being evalu-
ated, might account for the observed results. In the case of conven-
ience store robbery, there are some obvious questions to raise about
other changes in the environment. Did the number of convenience
stores in Gainesville decline because of the higher costs imposed by
the law? Did the number operating at night decline? Were there
any active robbery suspects specializing in convenience stores who
were apprehended at about the same time that the two clerk law
went into effect?
The best way to control for history is by examination of trends
in nearby or similar environments which did not adopt the policy
change, using them as a comparison or a control group. Thus we
would ask of Gainesville, what were the trends in convenience store
robberies in nearby jurisdictions? If the trends were up, we might
interpret that as meaning the strategy worked in Gainesville, though
at the price of displacement of Gainesville robbers to one-clerk
store environments in other jurisdictions. If the trends elsewhere
were flat, we would still give more credence to success in Gainesville
than if we did not know that fact. But if the trends nearby were
downward, it would provide strong evidence for a history effect and
weaken our confidence in concluding that the two-clerk policy was a
success.
B. TESTING
A second major principle is called testing, or some aspect of the
intervention and its measurement that may change the behavior of
the subjects. 42 In the case of the convenience store robbery, the
measurement of the problem depended completely on reports by
the clerks themselves. When they were working alone at night, it
would be relatively easy for them to report a robbery that never oc-
curred, and then pocket the money. Once a second clerk was pres-
41 SMITH, supra note 39, at 62.
42 Id., at 63.
700 [Vol. 82
BOOK REVIEWS
ent in the store, dishonest clerks were suddenly faced with the
necessity of enlisting a co-conspirator, at least if they wished to use
robbery as a cover for their embezzlement. Reluctance to trust co-
employees could have led them to reduce substantially their rate of
reporting robberies. They might conceivably develop plans for
staged robberies, in which a friend comes to the store when the
available cash is high and takes the money by threat of force to both
clerks. But such accomplice jobs are also much harder to orches-
trate than simple fraudulent robbery reports.
C. INSTABILITY
The principle of evaluation that even the Gainesville police ac-
knowledged in their analysis, but which Goldstein does not report in
his book, is called instability, or chance fluctuations in the frequency
of the events being measured. 43 Tests of statistical significance are
usually employed to eliminate this rival hypothesis, and the Gaines-
ville report noted the results of the first six months were not tested
for statistical significance. Such a test would have been largely
pointless, given the small numbers of events per month before and
after the law went into effect. Robberies of convenience stores in
1987 were originally reported to have declined to thirty, from sev-
enty-four in 1986. On a monthly basis, which is the appropriate unit
of analysis for the relevant statistical tests, this represents a decline
from 6.2 to 2.5 convenience store robberies per month, small num-
bers indeed for a nationally influential conclusion about effective
policing.44 Yet Goldstein's book does'not even mention the actual
43 Id., at 68.
44 Some have made the same comment about the Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, an early attempt to develop problem-oriented policing. Lawrence W. Sher-
man & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effect ofArrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc.
REV. 261 (1984); Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Family
Violence Incidents, 83 J. OF THE Am. STAT. ASS'N 70 (1988). Ironically, Goldstein (at 172)
cites this viewpoint [Arnold Binder &James W. Meeker, Experiments as Reforms, 16J. OF
C i.JusT. 347 (1988)] as evidence for his conclusion that the Minneapolis experiment
was "promoted in ways unjustified by its limited nature," an issue he fails to raise about
his own promotion of the Gainesville and other anecdotal cases of problem-oriented
policing throughout the book. Yet the Minneapolis experiment was a randomized, con-
trolled experiment finding statistically significant results with a sample of 314 cases,
about which even a strong critic of promotion says, "from the standpoint of social sci-
ence it is an excellent piece of work." Richard A. Lempert, From the Editor, 18 LAw AND
Soc'y REV. 505 (1984). The justification for "promoting" the Minneapolis experiment
was fully equal to the justification for the standard "promotion" of medical research
findings [Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy:
The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 117, 135 (1989)],
especially because the promotion of Minneapolis encouraged a federal agency to fund
replications of the original research in other sites which contradicted the Minneapolis
results and helped advance police understanding of this problem. Franklyn Dunford,
1991]
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number of convenience store robberies in the Gainesville experi-
ment; it only reports the percentages.
D. REGRESSION TO THE MEAN
A related principle of evaluation is called regression to the mean, or
the tendency of any extreme developments over time to return to
normal.45 The children of geniuses are almost never quite so smart,
the children of very short men are usually somewhat taller, stock
market booms go bust and busts rebound. In public policy evalua-
tions, the danger of this pattern is that the reason policies are
adopted is the problems they address have recently suffered ex-
tremely high levels by historical standards. If the policy is adopted
at the peak of the distribution, a decline in the frequency would be
expected with no intervention. In reporting that the two clerk law
was followed by a 65% reduction in robbery, Goldstein does not
raise the question of whether the base level for that percentage
change was an historically high frequency period for that particular
problem.
E. INSTRUMENTATION
A more probing principle of evaluation is called instrumentation:
did the procedures for measuring the problem change at the same
time the new policy was adopted, as is often the case?46 In the
Gainesville case, this simply means assuring that the definition of
convenience stores remained the same before and after the new law,
at least for purposes of comparing the number of convenience store
robberies. While even asking such questions might be defined as
insulting, the answers can often be surprising.
F. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES TO THE GAINESVILLE CASE
As it happens, answers to questions from the principles of eval-
uation became available shortly after Goldstein's book went to
press. But the content of the answers is not the point. Far more
important is the fact that the book does not even raise questions
about the anecdotal evidence on problem-oriented policing. The
David Huizinga & Delbert S. Elliot, The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police
Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990); J. David Hirschel, et al., Charlotte Spouse Assault
Replication Project: Final Report, National Insitute of Justice (1990). Yet "replication," a
key concept in science for understanding and verifying results, is a word that does not
even appear in the index to Goldstein's book.
45 SMITH, supra note 39, at 65.
46 Id., at 63.
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content of the answers about Gainesville merely demonstrates the
importance of the more general point.
In a study funded under a small contract from the National As-
sociation of Convenience Stores-an admitted "interest group"-
former Washington, D.C. police chief Jerry V. Wilson attempted in
early 1990 to answer the questions raised above.47 Wilson holds no
graduate degree and has no technical training in interrupted time
series analysis, autoregressive integrated moving averages (ARIMA)
modeling 48, or other highly academic skills often used in before-af-
ter evaluation. But he was able to address each of the principles in a
clear fashion, within the limitations of the data made available to
him by the Gainesville Police and Alachua County Sheriff's Office.
Wilson found that almost all possible rival hypotheses sug-
gested by Campbell's principles of evaluation had strong evidence
to support them. More important, he found that the monthly
number of convenience store robberies had dropped from seven-
teen to two, four months prior to the law becoming effective, with no
change in monthly numbers after the two clerks were required. In
other words, the essential facts of the claimed reduction were not
before-and-after, as originally reported, but before-and-before.
Thus we see the great need for respecting the first principle of eval-
uation (or any investigation): to establish the facts, quite apart from
their interpretation, no matter what the problem-solvers have
claimed.
The timing of the drop in convenience store robberies lends
strong support for the history hypothesis. The drop occurred in De-
cember 1986, about the same month in which the City of Gainesville
activated a number of other mandatory convenience store security
measures short of two clerks (such as restricted cash on hand, cam-
eras for photographing thieves, and keeping signs off windows to
increase visibility of the clerks). Also in that December, Alachua
County Police told Wilson that three men suspected of being active
convenience store robbers had been incarcerated. The men were
suspected of committing robberies in both the City and the County,
and both jurisdictions show the same sudden drop in robberies in
the month the men were arrested. The County, however, adopted
no new ordinances or convenience stores, and thus serves as a good
control or comparison site. While there is admitted tension be-
47 Jerry V. Wilson of the Crime Control Research Corporation, Gainesville Conven-
ience Store Ordinance: Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations (1990)
(unpublished report, on file at the J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY).
48 RICHARD MCCLEARY & RICHARD A. HAY, JR., APPLIED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS FOR
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1980).
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tween the Gainesville Police chief and the Alachua County Sheriff, it
is hard to imagine that the Sheriff's staff would fabricate such dra-
matic statistical evidence just to make the Chief look bad.
Wilson found no evidence that the number of convenience
stores had declined after the ordinance, so that there was apparently
no change in the population of stores at risk. But the decline of
robberies in that population preceded the two clerk law, and two
strong alternate explanations highly correlated at the point in time
when the drop did occur. This alone would tend to refute the con-
clusion that the robberies dropped as a result of the two clerk ordi-
nance, although it is consistent with the theory that the drop was a
result of some police work. The important issue, given the question
of future legislation, is which aspect of police work.
The instability of the data was reported in the original Gaines-
ville police study, but the regression to the mean was not. The period
just prior to the enactment of the ordinance was, in fact, character-
ized by an unusually steep increase in the volume of convenience
store robberies in Gainesville. This clearly supports the rival hy-
pothesis of regression to the mean for at least a portion of the re-
duction in robberies. The annual numbers of such robberies49,
without adjustment for changing definitions of convenience stores
in police statistics, were fifty-two in 1981, twenty in 1982, twenty-
seven in 1983, thirty in 1984, thirty-three in 1985, and sixty-one in
1986. The base year for calculating results of police work, then, had
about twice the number of convenience store robberies as the an-
nual mean of thirty-three for the preceding five years. The subse-
quent numbers were twenty-three in 1987 (when the two clerk law
became effective in April), eighteen in 1988, and sixteen in 1989, for
an average of nineteen, or about 33% lower than the mean before
1986. This is still impressive, but we must recall the many changes
in the environment other than the requirement to employ two clerks
at night. Moreover, Alachua County's robberies of convenience
stores dropped from fifty-three in 1986 to twenty in 1987. In both
jurisdictions, most of the 1986 total had been in the months leading
up to the capture of the three suspects.
Finally, Wilson did find difficulties with instrumentation that un-
dermine the apparent 33% reduction from the 1981-85 period. Af-
ter 1987, it is impossible to gauge the trends in Gainesville's
convenience store robberies compared to 1986 as the base year.
The two-clerk law exempted nine of the fifty stores classified as
49 These figures come from WILSON, supra note 47, and from the Gainesville Police
Department, supra note 22, which contains the figure of seventy-four robberies for 1986.
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"convenience" by police in 1986, because they earned over half
their sales from gasoline. The department could supply no statistics
on robberies that included these nine stores after 1987. Wilson was
unable to find any data on possible changes in the frequency of em-
ployee theft fraudulently reported as robbery.
In sum, Gainesville is hardly a "classic" example of an effective
problem-solving process, as Goldstein claims. 50 It is, rather, a clas-
sic example of the difficulties of interpreting the causes of changes
in problems before and after a solution is implemented. Neither
Gainesville in particular nor convenience store robbery are unique.
Literally all of the examples of fully developed problem-solving in
Goldstein's book take the form of before-after comparisons, in one
way or another, since that is the logic of his strategy. And to a
greater or lesser degree, the principles of evaluation illustrated by
the Gainesville case apply to all the other examples as well.
IV. How MUCH EVALUATION IS ENOUGH?
It is just as serious a matter to call a piece of police work a suc-
cess as it is to call it a failure. As Goldstein himself observed in
1982, reflecting on his experiences in Madison51 , it is a mistake to
take statistical claims by police at face value-which is good advice
for all governmental or corporate officials, for that matter. The
Gainesville case shows why that advice should be in Goldstein's
book. What the case does not show is any clear standard for when
to probe a claim of success, and when to accept it regardless of any
possible rival hypotheses.
The question of how much rigor is necessary in evaluating the
effects of public policies is clearly a difficult one, in which social sci-
ence as a profession has a clearly acknowledged interest. Gold-
stein's great contribution and the point of many of his examples, is
to show that professional social scientists have no monopoly on the
identification and diagnosis of problems or the invention of new solu-
tions. That can and should be the basic part of police strategy. As
Lindblom and Cohen pointed out the year Goldstein's initial paper
was published, social science is only one of many possible ap-
proaches to social problem solving, "because other forms of infor-
mation and analysis-ordinary knowledge and causal analysis
foremost among them-are often sufficient or better than" profes-
50 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 81. There is no doubt however, that he is correct in
singling out as a model of analysis or diagnosis of a problem leading to a police re-
sponse, whatever its deficiencies in assessing the effects of the response.
51 Herman Goldstein, Address at the Police Foundation Consultation on Police Or-




But the value of social science for solving problems is different
from the value of social science principles for evaluating the effective-
ness of a solution. Neither problem-solving nor solution-assessing
are activities which require professional certification as a social sci-
entist, but social science principles do have far greater value for the
latter of the two activities. Police themselves can be trained in these
principles of evaluation to perform more reliable peer assessments
of results.
If problem-solving succeeds in becoming the predominant
strategy of American policing, there may be far too many problems
addressed for an independent review of every police result in any
depth. Goldstein is right to seek a middle ground between no as-
sessment at all, on the one hand, and complex or costly research, on
the other. The vital question which he does not answer is what the
middle ground should look like.
Failure to create a reliable system for assessing police results
will mean a failure to institutionalize the importance of results them-
selves in American policing. If that happens, the basic goal of Gold-
stein's strategy will be displaced, even with widespread adoption of
the process. The police may again become bus drivers too busy to
stop for passengers. The only difference will be a different model
bus.
One possible way to avoid this danger and to institutionalize
better measurement of results is to train supervisors in principles of
evaluation, supplemented by a specialized police evaluation unit for
more complex assessments. The effort put into assessing results
could then vary along several sliding scales. One scale might be the
scope of the problem or its solution, with city-wide problems receiv-
ing more evaluation effort than solutions aimed at a single address
or a single person. Another scale might be the level of police effort
put into solving a problem; the more effort invested, the more inten-
sive evaluation required. A third scale might be the on-going cost of
the solution, either to the police agency or to some external organi-
zation. The more costly the solution-as in the case of convenience
store clerks-the more probing the evaluation should be for rival
hypotheses.
As Alfred North Whitehead once said, "Seek simplicity and dis-
trust it."3 Goldstein's view of evaluating results of police work is
52 CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & DAVID K. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE
AND SOCIAL PROBLEM SOLVING 10 (1979).
53 Quoted in SMITH, supra note 39, at 315.
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half right. While it is unnecessary to make every small scale police
assignment a matter of complex or elaborate evaluation, it is abso-
lutely necessary to subject big efforts to big assessments. The more
important the issue, the broader the scope of persons affected by
the police response, and the greater the cost of the response, the
more simplicity of evaluation should be distrusted.
Colquhoun kept updating and expanding his Treatise on Police
for a full seven editions. The enormous influence Goldstein's trea-
tise has already acquired will more than justify a revised edition. If
future volumes can expand on the need for more rigorous assess-
ment of police results by police themselves, Goldstein will complete
his blueprint for building a new police institution. The result will
stand far longer than the current version.
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THE POLITICS OF REDRESS: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND PENAL ABOLI-
TION. By Willem de Haan. Unwin Hyman Ltd., 1990. Pp. 205.
$15.95.
This book develops a critical examination of the politics of
crime, the question of punishment in a just order, and reform in
penology. In a rather short but clearly written, non-dogmatic style,
Willem de Haan skillfully presents some clear-headed thinking
about issues often circuitously addressed. Central to his efforts is a
reconceptualization of punishment in terms of "redress," and be-
yond that, a call for more creative, and even more idealistic
theorizing.
De Haan first addresses the "crisis" in critical criminology. He
traces the origins of radical/critical criminology and its search for a
critical social theory. Pointing out the shortcomings of conventional
criminological thought about the definition of crime and justifica-
tion of punishment he notes that much of "realism", whether Left
or Right, is rooted in an enterprise constitutive of common-sense
understandings of crime and punishment and hence supportive, in-
advertently or advertently, of the consolidation of a conservative
"law-and-order" mentality. Drawing inspiration from the abolition-
ist movement centered in Europe, he questions the wisdom of the
Left in its tactics of simply replying to the conservative agenda of
the Right. Necessary is transcendental activity, a praxis leading to
societal change, rather than a reactive-negative politics. In fact, the
Right has successfully captured the conceptual apparatus by formu-
lating a common-sense answer to the compelling social problems of
the age, including crime and punishment, while the Left has offered
questionable solutions. De Haan, continuing to draw from the abo-
litionist movement, indicates that we should get away from defining
troubles as "crime"; crime is a myth which well supports ever more
pervasive methods of control. Instead, we should reconceptualize
crime in an alternative discourse that centers on troubles faced by
agents in a political economy. Perhaps, he suggests, crime should
wither away as a concept and so too, theories of crime.
The Left often inadvertently contributes to the expansion of
control-talk; for example, de Haan asks us to consider some recent
social movements - environmental, feminist, and minority - and
their generated "get-tough-with-the-violator" discourse. Clearly,
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societal problems of major magnitude exist; the central question for
de Haan becomes definitional and one concerning the appropriate
societal reaction. More specifically, he argues, the current crisis
rests more on the contemporary "fuzzy politics and morals" of the
critical criminological movement. Coming from a noted critical
criminologist, this self-reflective critique of the critical/radical crimi-
nological paradigm is welcome. All too often within "progressive"
movements, in their haste to move from here to there,forms of domi-
nation are reinvented or reconstituted in new guise. The call for
"reversing of the hierarchies," for example, a catchword incorpo-
rated from Jacques Derrida's postmodernist approach, too often
means replacing one form of domination by another with self-serv-
ing ideological baggage and often resulting in further societal
problems.' This is yet another example of "fuzzy politics."
He then examines the often stated hypothesis that correlates
unemployment rates with rising imprisonment rates. He shows that
what has been overlooked is that the key factor seems to be the cor-
relation between rising unemployment rates and increased duration
of imprisonment, rather than just increased imprisonment rates.
Looking at imprisonment rates and unemployment rates in the
Netherlands, he disputes conventional critical criminological wis-
dom that argues that employment is the best predictor variable of
imprisonment rates.2
Next, de Haan suggests for serious thought Jurgen H.
Habermas' much debated "ideal speech situation" as offering a po-
tentially alternative method in reaching understanding in forums for
dispute-settlements. 3 He advocates a practical rationality devoid of
instrumental means-ends rationality guided by the media of power,
money, and exclusively efficiency-centered considerations. This the-
sis leads directly into the question of the necessity of punishment in
a just order. Taking the position of a "moral rationalist" - that
moral judgments can be rationally developed - de Haan advocates
the use of reason iooted in deductive or inductive logic in context.
Hence the appeal of Habermas' ideal speech situation. It is open,
flexible to the unfolding activities of human activity, and allows each
party to participate in a discourse replete with criticizable validity
claims. Only in formalism with its underlying support of instrumen-
tal rationality are human agents stripped of their historically spe-
cific, multifarious nature. Thus, de Haan redefines the debate
1 See JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans. 1982).
2 This argument is particularly well-presented by Steven Box's much heralded find-
ings reported in RECESSION, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1987).
3 See JURGEN H. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 107-08 (1975).
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concerning the question of the inevitability of punishment in a just
order by reconceptualizing terms.
Accordingly, much theorizing by such notables as Alan
Gewirth4 and Derek Phillips,5 he argues, are focused on sanction
rather than punishment, and is hopelessly stuck with a unicausal
model which stipulates punishment necessarily following crime.
This leads inevitably to tautological arguments. This model just
perpetuates suffering; it does not offer compensation for loss, ac-
cording to de Haan. For de Haan, Habermas offers the potential for
developing a substantive, rationally-based justification of moral
principles rooted in symbolic communication, or in other words,
practical rationality that is context specific.
In many ways, de Haan's call does resurrect Max Weber's com-
parison of ideal-typical forms of legal thought such as formal ration-
ality, formal irrationality, substantive rationality, and substantive
irrationality. 6 It was Weber who first noted the "irresolvable con-
flict" between legal principles rooted in substantive as opposed to
formal rationality and justice. De Haan's position could find a will-
ing ally in Weber's examination of substantive rational forms of
legal thought and social control. This remains to be examined.
De Haan's thesis also continues a recent trend by radi-
cal/critical theorists' questioning whether punishment has a place in
a just order. Jeffrey H. Reiman, for example, building on the John
Rawl's classic A Theory of Justice,7 offers what he calls rationally-de-
rived first principles of justice which can be applied deductively.
8
These moral principle embody the belief that "where people do coop-
erate to produce benefits that went into producing
them.. .inequalities must work to maximize the share of everyone in
society starting from the worst-off individual." Reiman's view, un-
like de Haan's, attempts to root a moral discourse materialistically in
a political economy in his idea of a "labor theory of moral value."
Between de Haan and Reiman much important and assuredly useful
debate will surely arise.
The next chapter examines the demise of popular justice tribu-
nals in Cuba and the movement toward formalization. De Haan asks
whether their experience can shed light on the development of
moral first principles for movements in the United States. He offers
4 ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978).
5 DEREK PHILLIPS, TOWARD A JUST SOCIAL ORDER (1986).
6 For a description of Max Weber and his work, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, MAX
WEBER (1983).
7 JOHN RAWL, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8 See JEFFREY H. REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1990).
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much first hand experience as well as theoretical examination. He
concludes that the Cuban socialist legality is useless in its potential
applicability to a capitalist economy. He refrains from any outright
condemnatory remarks, although, perhaps, one may take him to task
and accuse his unwillingness to do so as a case of fuzzy politics.
Certainly much good, as well as much questionable activity, has, and
continues to take place in Cuba. To simply enter a conspiracy of
silence concerning shortcomings (to be discussed only privately in
Left circles), in my opinion, does a disservice to open and critical
examination, and is counterproductive in developing visions of pos-
sible non-subjugating, alternative political economies and social
formations.
In the last chapter, de Haan offers some insightful and refresh-
ing suggestions about alternatives. Having already argued that
practical discourse should be based on substantive rational princi-
ples, he offers the notion of "redress" to capture this alternative
conceptualization to the formalism of crime and punishment dis-
course. After examining alternatives to legalistic definitions of
crime - the Schwendingers' deductive approach on the one hand,9
and the feminist inductive approach on the other - he pleads that
no solution to the definitional problem exists (p. 154). The real an-
swer, again, is to reconceptualize terms. For de Haan, what needs to
be instituted is a form of practical discourse under the principle of
redress. It specifies a procedural justice rather than a formally sub-
stantive one. The elements of this discourse would include open-
ended discussion about "unfortunate events," the encouragement
of a diversity of reactions and analysis for each concrete situation,
which in turn would encourage the proliferation of alternative
meaning constructions. All this would be guided by a sensitivity to
alternative dispute regulatory mechanisms which provide clues for
alternative regulations of conflict. Decisions, therefore, should al-
ways be open-ended, subject to competing and criticizable validity
claims.
Practical discourse, one rooted in context, would also develop,
inductively, into general and principled conclusions (p. 159). It is
only in this way that the complexities and multifarious nature of
agency and accountability could be understood; on the one hand
leading inductively to new principled conclusions, and on the other,
acting as an open-ended guide for deductive lines of application.
9 Herman & Julia Siegel Schwendinger, Defenders of Order? Or Guardians of Human




To assure its feasibility, de Haan argues that we need (1) some min-
imal level of communicative competence by interlocutors and
(2) some process by which potentially endless practical discourse
could be brought to closure. As to the latter, some legal system still
would be necessary to assure closure, fairness, and compliance (p.
167). This seemingly sticky dilemma of advocating, on the one
hand, a practical discourse and, on the other, the necessity of a legal
form rooted in legal rationality is answered by de Haan by his insis-
tence for a search for the discovery of principles that are mutually
compatible (p. 168). He seems to suggest that a continuously evolv-
ing system of inductive and deductive open-ended principles could
address the question of generalizability as well as being sensitive to
the uniqueness of contexts in producing a more human politics of
redress.
What can be said of all this? De Haan has stimulated discussion
for a wide audience. He demands that readers of his book become
engaged. Responses will surely materialize from a broad political
spectrum extending from the Right to Left, both praising and con-
demning his conclusions. However, he boldly encourages thinking
in both directions: realism and idealism. The important point of all
this is that we can have a happy marriage of the two. At a time
where movements, both on the Left and the Right, are gaining mo-
mentum toward some form of "realism", this is a courageous and
admirable call. Certainly de Haan's examination is not only critical
of conventional criminology, but also critically reflects on the situa-
tion within his own paradigm. It's about time! His suggestions are
enlightening. We need, he tells us, a practical discourse rooted in
context which can be given form in the notion of "redress." This
discourse would be open-ended. Inductively and deductively devel-
oped notions of moral principles could replace formal control-talk
discourse based on purposive, mean-ends rational discourse which
is guided by money, power, and exclusively efficiency considera-
tions. His criticism of the Right in its articulation of a receptive, but
questionable solution to the crime and imprisonment problem, as
well as his criticism of the Left in its often fuzzy politics and morals,
is a welcomed commentary to the often unconfronted shortcomings
of particular paradigm-invoked thinking.
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